Common sampling policy

I have the Wikipedia page which collates polling data on the EU referendum bookmarked, as all nerds do, and I was taking my daily cursory look at it this morning when something struck me about it. I fed the data into Excel to check I wasn’t overinterpreting, and there it was again.

The following graph shows sample size (on the X axis) plotted against Remain’s lead in the polls (on the Y axis).

graph 1

In general, the smaller the sample size, the larger the Remain lead is. This is largely because of the telephone polls: ORB’s phone polls always have a sample size of 800 exactly, and all the sub-1,000 sample polls are conducted by phone.

What to make of this? Here’s another chart: this time, assessing the the general election polls and the Conservative lead:

graph 2

It’s perhaps a little hard to make out, but if I’m not mistaken, the general election polls don’t show such a sharp disparity. Small sample sizes show exaggerated leads in one direction or another, but there’s almost as many figures below the X axis as above it. At the general election, the polls all clustered around a tie, which turned out to be very wrong indeed. Contrast that to the EU referendum polls, where there’s a much more marked profusion of big Remain leads in the little polls and a much more close picture in the big ones.

I’d hazard a guess that the bigger sample sizes are probably more accurate, but that depends on the polling companies having sorted out their methodologies. As it is, we’re flying blind.

Leave a comment

Filed under Politics

Some thoughts on status quo bias

Peter Kellner observed in the New Statesman yesterday that the last few referendums in the UK have all seen a late shift to the status quo, with the somewhat sui generis exception of the 1997 Scottish devolution referendum. He concludes from this assessment that history favours Remain this month, arguing that six of the seven referendums he discusses show support for the status quo.

Mr Kellner’s article has superficial appeal, but he’s guilty of leaving out almost half of the eleven referendums which have been held in the UK since 1975, which might undermine his thesis somewhat. In the below table I have listed all the referendums in the UK since 1975 (deliberately excluding the 1973 Northern Ireland border poll, which was boycotted by the nationalist community); the rows in red were excluded from Mr Kellner’s article.

table

*The 1979 Scottish devolution referendum resulted in a narrow (51.6-48.3) win for the pro-devolution side, but turnout failed to reach the 40% threshold imposed by Parliament in order for the referendum to have effect.
†The 1997 Scottish devolution referendum was made up of two questions, the first on the establishment of a Scottish Assembly and the second on whether it should have tax-varying powers. Both proposals passed.

By my reckoning, far from the status quo being the dominant response of the British electorates to a referendum question, it is actually slightly less likely than a vote for change – five questions asked were answered with the status quo response, while seven were endorsements of the proposed reform. Even excluding the 1979 Scottish referendum because of its turnout threshold and the 1998 referendum on the Good Friday Agreement because of its unique context brings us to an even total of five for five, with the status quo only taking a narrow lead if the 1997 Scotland referendum is collapsed into one. Mr Kellner has – perhaps deliberately – massaged his figures to portray votes in favour of change as significantly less common than they are.

Even his rather specious argument that the changes which succeed are those which endorse a ‘national consensus’  has virtually no value whatsoever. Perhaps the Scottish Assembly (as it then was) was indeed established as part of a national consensus. The same could not be said of the Welsh assembly powers referendum in 2011, nor even the 1979 referendum in Scotland which he explains away due to the insertion of a wrecking amendment by a Labour MP. It should be noted further that those two referendums exhibited the narrow margins which seem increasingly likely in the referendum this month, which should give both sides this time pause.

Ultimately, talk about bias towards the status quo misses something which may be quite important. In almost all previous referendums, the status quo is something which has existed for a very long time – since time immemorial, even. The Union between Scotland and England dates to 1707, and the Union of Crowns is a century older than that. Parliament has been sovereign in the North East, London, Northern Ireland, Wales and Scotland since the concept was first described. The first-past-the-post system has been the process for all British general elections since the expansion of the franchise, and predates even that for a much more limited electorate.

The exception, of course, is the 1975 European Communities referendum, where a relatively new ‘status quo’ – more or less a government policy – was endorsed merely two years after it was enacted. In 2016, the idea that the EU benefits from status quo bias and incumbency is dependent upon the idea that the EU has weaved into national consciousness as much as first-past-the-post, the sovereign Parliament or the very Unitedness of the Kingdom.

I’m not sure that’s so. Stronger In has been trying to run this sort of campaign, but it’s stuttering somewhat. My suspicion is that this is because the EU is almost a victim of its own success: so effective at inveigling itself into national economies that nobody even notices it’s there any more. Even whinging about Europe in tabloid newspapers has a detached quality, a sense of newness and alienness – consider the Metric Martyrs case for an example of this in action. It seems that the pro-EU side, which planned to run a simple defence of the status quo with the expected 2-1 walloping, is having to make the case for the EU afresh, as if we were being asked to join it rather than remain in it. Whether this affects the result remains to be seen, but it seems implausible to suggest the British electorate is on autopilot this time around.

‡Sort of. See MacCormick v Lord Advocate [1953] SC 396.

Leave a comment

Filed under Politics

On a train bound for nowhere

I don’t often think about primary school. Well, it would be more accurate to say I can’t. I have scattered memories of those years – a game of tig here, a pair of broken glasses there – but nothing to dwell upon. At that age, the memory is like the broad, clumsy brush-strokes on the Van Gogh pastiches we made when we were seven: bright colours, vague impressions, little coherence.

I do remember one moment quite well. I was perhaps nine, and the school had decided to teach us something practical: in this instance, we were called upon to put together little boats capable of traversing a trough of water, using only balsa wood and elastic bands. My teacher found my response to the creative writing task I’d been working on before that amusing and gave me some extra time to finish it (some arch comedy I had ripped off from a video game). By the time I got my hands on the balsa wood I was well behind everyone else and had to work alone.

I fiddled and worked at it for days, but try as I might, I couldn’t get the propeller working. The fat chunk of wood I had tried to use for the purpose splashed about hopelessly, spraying my little blue polo shirt with ice-cold water. On the upside, it cooled me down a little bit, after the quiet, burning, humiliated tears had receded. So I gave up. On reflection, the boat had been badly designed from the start – too heavy at the front, too prone to weakness at the back. It would never have got to the finish line anyway.

Then I got home and watched Pokémon, I imagine. That was pretty much all I watched at that age. As I recall, Ash usually won against all the odds. It’s funny that the odds were never, never in his favour. Yet he always won. Isn’t that interesting?

 


 

Tristram Hunt’s article in the New Statesman on the European referendum, deriding Brexit as a “self-defeating dereliction of duty and history”, is an impressive piece of work. Its rousing defence of the EU as a unifying force for liberal democracy dovetails with his cool dismissal of Michael Gove’s purportedly Whiggish view of British history and Daniel Hannan’s slurping plutophilia. It is almost convincing. Yet an impressive piece of work is still a piece of work, so to speak, and Mr Hunt replaces Rhodesian Anglocentrism with Whiggism of his own.

Mr Hunt’s thesis, in essence, is that the EU is an institution of reform, of blunting the sharp edges of capitalism. He sets out his stall thus:

As a progressive, I want to remain within a supranational institution that has the capacity to help reform capitalism for the digital age. On issues such as tax justice, workers’ rights, climate change, environmental protection, international trade and poverty alleviation the EU plays a positive role.

Anticipating the objections, however, this statement of the obvious is immediately qualified by the following:

Yes, it is difficult for us liberals to defend its recent treatment of Greece, its inertia on the refugee crisis, or its institutional lethargy towards proper democratic accountability. But social justice requires co-operation beyond our borders, and the fact remains that the only sustained period of peace in modern European history directly coincides with the EU’s creation.

This is the case in a nutshell, really. I have bolded the words ‘institutional lethargy’ above, because it is not that institutional lethargy is, as Mr Hunt implies, a bug in the EU’s system, a thorn in its side, a fly in its ointment. Far from being something that prevents the system from solving the refugee crisis or sorting out the vertiginous scale of European debt, institutional lethargy is the EU’s system.

Why? In 1945, Europe lay in ruins, utterly exhausted by the most savage conflict in human history. There was, however briefly, the opportunity for the occupying American forces west of Berlin to impose a new sovereign state on West Germany, France, Italy and the Benelux: the ‘United States of Europe’ coined by Churchill in his Zurich speech in 1946. This would be the state of the future, the one that through gradual, measured expansion could lead the world towards progress, sweeping away the nationalisms of the past as one more ideology that had been utterly defeated along with Nazism and fascism. It would manifest a destiny for humanity itself.

But this was bottled, of course, as these things usually are. Instead we got gradualism: first the Coal and Steel Community, with its noxious air of strapping, 1950s industrialism; second the Economic Community, a gentle, unassumingly technocratic creature in the background of the Cold War; lastly the Union, our Union, Maastricht and Lisbon duetting the harmony that serenaded the end of history and the nuclear peace. With gradualism came intergovernmentalism, and with intergovernmentalism came a big, dripping, juicy platter of pork, farmed through the Common Agricultural Policy. Worse still came a regulatory environment which punished experimentation and stifled the development of economic systems to rival the Union’s unambitious own. All roads led to Rome – and it was those roads or the high road, buster.

Instead of a system which serves the people of Europe, we have a system which serves its governments. Every item of European policy is created through horse-trading between governments, in arduous negotiations that eventually reach a limping settlement for ministers to sell to their parties and their people: look at David Cameron’s pathetic renegotiation for an example of this in progress. Yet if we needed an example, Greece has been the butt of the EU’s institutional incompetence for years – not just in the ongoing failure to resolve its debt crisis, but the abject chaos unfolding on its islands as Europe scrambles to make up for the consequences of Germany’s unilateral (and democratically-endorsed) embrace of open borders. The German drum is the loudest beat on the Continent, but there aren’t many states who can keep up any more.

In a functional system, countries would be able to be flexible, play to their strengths, and operate in an air of competition and open dealing. Instead, far from creating a shining beacon of free trade and democracy, we have generated a system so laden with rules, processes and legal challenges that it replicates the deadlock of another federal government a mere ocean away. And just like that mighty republic, we work with filthy criminals to mitigate the impact of our own overextension. Rather than being the great peacekeeper on the Continent, the last few years have proved how wholly reliant on a NATO-enforced peace the EU is. Take away its air of tranquility – threaten it from the east or the south – and it proves incapable of even adapting its own system, let alone contributing to international stability. There was, of course, a precedent for this, but faced with the havoc erupting in the Mediterranean we have even less excuse.

 


 

Mr Hunt continues:

When even the United Kingdom itself faces an uncertain future, I believe we need to stand up and renew the ties that bind. To walk away from Europe in its latest hour of need would be an entirely self-defeating dereliction of duty and history; a betrayal of our traditional role as a force for peace, security and the proper balance of powers. Brexit is the politics of defeat and the philosophy of decline. We must resist those siren voices and lead both ourselves and the Continent towards a more open, liberal, democratic, freer, fairer and stronger future.

It would be nice if the European Union could be led to a more open, liberal, democratic, freer, fairer and stronger future. But it cannot be led at all. It is set up precisely to frustrate being led by anyone, because every state obeys their rational individual incentives to change nothing at all and preserve their own privileges. Like my boat, it’s too big, too heavy, and its propeller judders limply as the vessel floats with all the others, becalmed, somewhere in the Mediterranean.

If Europe became a sovereign state of the core six, then perhaps – perhaps – it could be rejoined. But the EU as it stands is just not good enough, and calls for a stronger European Parliament just delay the issue – and run up against the fact that the Council and Commission have no reason to give up their power. The longer the EU exists, the weaker Europe becomes, more and more vulnerable to Erdoğan’s thumbscrews, the long, dark Russian winter and the sheer entropy of its own economic ennui.

The boats of Europe lie rather low in the water, and time is running out. When confronted with the proof that great projects like the Eurozone (a Franco-German confection) and eastern expansion (Britain’s fault, mostly) are not working, the EU has no way to give up on those projects and try different ones like a nation-state can. Instead, it has to bet all the harder on a change in its fortunes: the gambler who, sure his losing streak will run out soon, divests himself of his wallet, then his car, then his house.

The odds are no longer good enough. Every hand’s a loser. It’s time, after forty years of gambling, to leave the table.

 


 

What we call the beginning is often the end

And to make an end is to make a beginning.

The end is where we start from.

-TS Eliot, Little Gidding (from Four Quartets)

 

1 Comment

Filed under Politics

On us, and our not taking it

Janan Ganesh, the FT’s political columnist, was born in 1982 (probably). At 33 or 34, that makes him just young enough to count as a Millennial, if Strauss and Howe’s grand theory of eternal return is taken as read, or at least pretended to have read. Perhaps this is, in part, why Ganesh’s column on why Millennials don’t know they’re born has produced such a stir: a convert is always more influential than a mere priest.

Ganesh’s piece is, as always, beautifully written. He understands the economy of words better than any prominent political writer in the UK. And to give him his due he is, of course, right when he seizes the pulpit to denounce the eschatological heresy of looming intergenerational Armageddon:

The fracturing of public life along generational lines has felt imminent for some time. And it will continue to feel imminent. Generational politics will never take off because no normal person identifies with a collective as large and internally diverse as their age cohort. It is too tenuous a bond to spur concerted civic action.

Yet despite this bracing good sense, his argument – that Millennials should be grateful for our luck of having been born in (for instance) 1990 as opposed to 1960 due to the “dazzling consumer gains that come with technology and competition multiplied by the passage of time” – fails to convince. Ganesh supposes that these consumer gains are in some way a cosmic compensation for the relative abject asset poverty into which my generation has been born, but to do so misunderstands the nature of the injustice which has been done to us.

Ganesh’s argument would hold if generational injustice was necessary to lower crime rates, reduce the cost of flights and accelerate the development of the smartphone, the iPad and Skype. This might excuse the imbalance as a payment we (unwillingly) made for our living standards – but Ganesh never proves this, or even adduces any evidence to that effect. It is no good saying to someone whose house has been burnt down by arsonists to cheer up because it’s a sunny day outside: it was always going to be a sunny day, thank you, and I’d rather have lemonade on the front porch than rubble and a suntan.

Of course I (on balance) would rather be born in 1990 than 1960. I’m less likely to get beaten up or robbed; I’m less likely to die abroad; I have access to the sum of all human knowledge at my fingertips. But unless stagnant wages and low house prices were necessary for me to have these things (not, in fact, a ridiculous supposition given how capitalism and competition operated in the West), I’m more than entitled to be angry with my lot. So is my cohort. Until research can confirm this hypothesis, the last word should be Ganesh’s:

Beneath the pose, there is nothing there.

Leave a comment

Filed under Politics

The nEUclear option

A comrade for Leave argues that repeal of the European Communities (EC) Act 1972 instead of activation of Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty is “not an option“, calling it “irresponsible”, “unthinkable”, “thoroughly un-British” and “a political and economic disaster”.

This is strong talk, and accurate too as far as it goes. There’s no doubt that an act as extreme as unilateral withdrawal from the EU outwith the provisions of the Treaty would be an internationally wrongful act earning us severe opprobrium and probably massive economic reprisals around the world. This is why it is not generally mentioned as the first resort for British disentanglement from Brussels. But it remains possible for the one reason Ben neglects to mention in his post.

The European Union rests on its processes and institutions making ongoing membership more attractive and (crucially, for democracies) less politically painful than reaping the potential benefits of flexibility outside is structures. Accordingly this requires the Member States to pressure each other not to give up on the project. It is comparable to unionisation: the many can only retain the benefits so long as individuals don’t break off and bargain on their own to undercut the others.

A unilateral British withdrawal, though painful in the short run, would remind other Member States that they retain their sovereignty, and accordingly the right in domestic law to quit the EU whenever they want. It operates, not as a thoughtful tool of public policy, but as a weapon, an earthshaker to disrupt the very foundations of the European project. In the aftermath of a British withdrawal, it seems likely that other countries with strongly Eurosceptic tendencies like Denmark and the Netherlands would start sabre-rattling over their own place in the EU, with government ministers perhaps issuing menacing innuendoes about leaving by fiat unless the EU gives them what they want. Doubtless the British government, sensing an opportunity, would be wooing these nations with promises of trade deals and alliance to counterbalance the ailing Union to the south.

It isn’t accurate to say that withdrawing without recourse to Article 50 is “not an option”. It is not a pleasant option, and it’s one we ought not to use without regard for the consequences. But it’s there like a hand grenade at a Mexican stand-off, and should be treated in the same way. The SALT treaties were only negotiated by accepting that the use of nuclear weapons was not just not unthinkable, but eminently thinkable. Only by doing so can we hope to avoid catastrophe.

Leave a comment

Filed under Politics

House rules

Tim Montgomerie posits that, if the US presidential election comes down to a four-way between Bernie Sanders (Dem), Marco Rubio (Rep), Donald Trump and Michael Bloomberg (Ind), Mr Sanders wins by a ten-point margin. This seems to be borne out by the YouGov panel which CapX consulted to come up with this answer, and I think there is fairly good evidence to suggest that Bernie Sanders would hold the Democratic vote against Bloomberg together better than Marco Rubio would against Donald Trump. It is important, however, not to confuse Mr Sanders winning in the popular vote with President Sanders being inaugurated in January 2017. This is because of the Electoral College.

In the United States, American citizens do not vote for President, they vote to send electors to the 538-strong Electoral College who vote (usually) for their respective candidate. Each state has a certain number of electors, one for each of their Representatives and Senators, plus three more from the District of Columbia. Forty-eight states give all their electors to whoever wins the statewide ballot; Maine and Nebraska give two each to the statewide winner, apportioning according to the winners in each congressional district to reflect their Representatives and Senators. If any candidate gets 270 votes (an absolute majority) in the Electoral College, he or she is elected President. The same process occurs for the election of the Vice-President.

Lashed screaming to the tracks in front of the clunking great anachronism train of the Electoral College, you may hear the obvious question rumbling obliviously toward you: what if no candidate wins enough states to get 270 electors? This seems eminently plausible with the four candidates running: Mr Rubio could easily take 29-elector Florida, for example, while Mr Bloomberg would present a strong challenge to seize the 29 electors from New York (and perhaps even the 55 from California). We must turn to the Twelfth Amendment to find out what happens in this scenario, and it’s more bizarre than one might first expect.

The Amendment reads:

…if no person have such majority, then from the persons having the highest numbers not exceeding three on the list of those voted for as President, the House of Representatives shall choose immediately, by ballot, the President. But in choosing the President, the votes shall be taken by states, the representation from each state having one vote; a quorum for this purpose shall consist of a member or members from two-thirds of the states, and a majority of all the states shall be necessary to a choice.

In plain English, what the Amendment means is that the House of Representatives must choose the  President from the three top-scoring candidates in the Electoral College (not in the popular vote). However, in doing so, individual Representatives do not get a vote; rather, their whole state’s delegation does; the new President, meanwhile, would need the support of at least 26 of the 50 states in order to take the oath of office on 20th January.

I’ll illustrate with an example. Say Mr Sanders wins a swathe of the East Coast, Mr Rubio the Mid-West and lower East Coast, Mr Trump the South and the Mexican border, and Mr Bloomberg New York and (for argument) California. For simplicity’s sake, we’ll suppose that Maine and Nebraska’s electors all go to one candidate, notwithstanding their somewhat unusual system (see above).This is, of course, fanciful, as it’s hard to predict how this four-way race would go in each state, but these numbers will serve for the point.

Let’s assume our notional Electoral College looks like this:

Candidate Electors
Bernie Sanders 160
Marco Rubio 176
Donald Trump 118
Michael Bloomberg 84
Total 538

 

This would mean that the House of Representatives, still composed wholly of Democrats and Republicans, would have to choose between Bernie Sanders, Marco Rubio and Donald Trump, since the fourth-place Bloomberg would be eliminated. However, it would not be as simple as a standard party-line vote: rather, each state gets a vote, and each of the state delegations has its own internal majority. For example, the mighty state of Wisconsin sends eight Representatives to the House, of whom five are Republican. In a deadlock, Wisconsin would vote for a Republican President.

So how would they choose? Well, after the 2014 mid-terms, the congressional districts look like this, making somewhat discouraging viewing for the Democrats:

Yet more important than the raw congressional districts (246 Rep, 188 Dem) is the fact that Republicans hold a majority on 31 of the 50 state delegations (the Democrats have 16 majorities, and there is a tie in the delegations from Maine, New Hampshire and New Jersey). Assuming Marco Rubio manages to get into the top three in the Electoral College, then, he will almost certainly become President: no matter what happens to the House of Representatives in November, the new House won’t take office until 3rd January and the old, Republican-dominated, 114th House of Representatives will choose the President after the Electoral College meets on 21st December.

This is by far the most likely scenario: If the Electoral College looks likely to divide, Mr Rubio’s chances of becoming President skyrocket regardless of which candidate commands the allegiance of a plurality of the American people, because the Republicans hold a majority on a majority of the state delegations to the House of Representatives. (Whew.)

A thought may occur to you: what if the 114th House of Representatives, balloted as prescribed in the Twelfth Amendment, fails to come to an absolute majority decision before the new, 115th House takes office on 4th January? Indeed, with the inspirational figure of Bernie Sanders at the front of their campaign, the Democrats might (maybe!) manage to replicate their 2008 results, giving the 115th House a Democratic majority. If this happens, we can see almost a mirror image of the 2014 House: the Obama wave delivered 34 Democrat-majority House delegations to 15 Republican, with Idaho as a perfect tie. In this case, against all odds, President Sanders is duly elected in the nick of time before Inauguration Day by an absolute majority of the states. (Double whew.)


 

Pause for a moment and take a breath. What if no decision is made by Inauguration Day on January 20th? Well, if this situation lasts until then, the Vice-President-elect will serve as acting President until one is chosen by the House. But how, in this state of deadlock, is the Vice-President chosen?

An aspirin might be helpful at this point.

…if no person have a majority, then from the two highest numbers on the list, the Senate shall choose the Vice-President; a quorum for the purpose shall consist of two-thirds of the whole number of Senators, and a majority of the whole number shall be necessary to a choice.

Unlike the House, the Senate is only entitled to choose between the two top-ranking candidates in the Electoral College, presumably the respective running mates of Bernie Sanders and Marco Rubio. As it stands, the 2014 Senate is majority-Republican, while it was Democrat-controlled in 2008, so if the vote follows the two scenarios already described there shouldn’t be too much administrative fuss and the victorious President would have the understudy of his choice. This would, on the analysis outlined above, probably be Marco Rubio’s (or Donald Trump’s!) running mate, who would be elected as Vice-President by a simple party-line vote in the Republican-majority Senate.

Yet since the Democrats might conceivably win back control of the House on an Sanders sweep, this gives us the intoxicating possibility that the two Houses of Congress could pick a socialist Democrat as President and a Republican (or Trumpist) Vice-President, depending on who comes in the top two in the Electoral College. This sounds like a hilarious quirk of fate or perhaps the setting for an excruciating political satire (like Veep meets Starsky & Hutch), until we remember that of the 43 individuals to have served as President, eight have died in office, giving the job a base mortality rate of 18.6%. Bernie Sanders, meanwhile, will be 75 on Inauguration Day 2017, the oldest President in history.

The final step, if the Senate is tied (50-50), is that the job of acting President falls to the next on the presidential line of succession after the President and Vice-President, until either branch of Congress gets its act together – which, given the Senate’s enthusiasm for the filibuster, could be rather a long time. As everyone knows, the second in line to the Presidency is the Speaker of the House, who is…

Paul_Ryan_by_Gage_Skidmore_3

Perhaps this was his plan all along!

So there you have it. On my analysis, the The Twelfth Amendment allows the House to elect a candidate who failed to win the popular vote, or gives us President Sanders and a Vice-President chosen either by Marco Rubio or Donald Trump, either of whom could become President at the drop of a geriatric. In extremis, it leads to (acting) President Paul Ryan. In other words, we face once again the hypothetical possibility that US would have the first President in known history who wears a baseball cap to weightlift. What better reason for reform could one need?

Leave a comment

Filed under Politics

The Strategy: why Jeremy Corbyn is actually a tactical genius (maybe)

Ever since Jeremy Corbyn became leader of the Labour Party, an awful lot of people have been expressing bewilderment at his actions, from appointments like the fragrant Seumas Milne or noted IRA fan John McDonnell to his somewhat frosty relationship with the press. Some have called him stupid or incompetent, but this seems unfair and unimaginative. Yet this leaves us with a question: if Mr Corbyn is, in fact, intelligent, what is the method to the madness? Why does he keep making so many mistakes?

The media management coming out of Brewer’s Green is as good a place to start as any. Amid the tantric reshuffle of the last few days have been a clutch of journalists soothingly advising Corbyn to more adequately brief the press on his stories. ‘After all,’ they counsel, ‘if you don’t give us any information beyond sacking Michael Dugher and overshadow your own big push on rail policy with a phantom reshuffle, we’re hardly going to report on anything else.’

In normal politics this would indeed be good advice. Dead cats are useful when it’s the enemy’s table onto which the fetid feline has been unceremoniously deposited, but doing it on your own table tends to lead to an upset stomach. Mr Corbyn’s ignorance of this basic premise lends credence to the currently dominant theory, i.e. Jez is an idiot, and even some of his backers are beginning to accept it.

However, it should surely be clear by now that politics stopped operating on normal rules some time ago. In normal politics, the goal for a leader of one of the main two parties is to win an election so you can enact your policies in government. However, under my theory of the new politics, Mr Corbyn’s primary aim is at all times to entrench the dominance of the hard left over the Labour Party, with electoral victory as a distant second or third priority. Stephen Bush, for instance, argued recently that if Corbyn falls it will be on grounds of competence rather than ideological incompatibility.

I think he is right in this, and Corbyn knows that if he is removed as the leader it will be the end of the hard-left project and the resumption of business as usual under a soft-left or centrist leader. However, it points to a less than obvious approach to continuing the September revolution.

It may seem counterintuitive, but Corbyn’s best response — the one that preserves his authority, and indeed that of the wider hard left —  is to appear as incompetent as possible at all times. Confronting his own supporters with evidence of his apparent failure to live up to the basic requirements of the job of Leader of the Opposition triggers a predictable psychological reaction; since his supporters would, by extension, look like idiots for backing an idiot, they will begin to deny reality. This is why the line from the Labour press office has been to blame the media for reporting on the wrong issue(s): since, the argument goes, the media should know what matters (i.e. floods, the railway policy, the Housing Bill) and what absolutely does not matter (i.e. the reshuffle), their refusal to report solely on the things that do matter on this interpretation is proof of bias. Accordingly, the media narrative of Corbyn’s inadequacy as leader can safely be disregarded, as it is not honestly held and is only used to help the (red) Tories establish their wicked neoliberal hegemony.

Once the media are established as collaborators with the enemy, Mr Corbyn’s dominance becomes largely unquestionable. If a leadership election were to be triggered, Labour’s moderates would be able to comfort themselves with the knowledge that this time everyone, including the selectorate, knows that Corbyn is useless. But they don’t — because the very people who shout proof of his incompetence from the rooftops of Fleet Street are now firmly established as enemies of the people who cannot be trusted. In this way, the very incompetence which would doom Corbyn in ordinary circumstances becomes a rallying point for the members and supporters whose loyal votes shield the leader from any challenge.

Now, the facts as we know them fit the mainstream theory very well too. Corbyn being a buffoon would be as adequate an explanation for the actions of his inner circle as anyone needs. Yet the theory of Corbyn as a tactical genius cementing his grip on the party is more useful, as it might stop moderates wasting any time on attempts to subvert him that won’t work. The parallel universe occupied by Corbyn’s supporters was always difficult to penetrate; his actions with regard to the press, deliberately or otherwise, are having the effect of making it impregnable.

1 Comment

Filed under Politics